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Abstract
While recognized as a theoretical and practical concept for over 20 years,
only now ransomware has taken centerstage as one of the most prevalent cy-
bercrimes. Various reports demonstrate the enormous burden placed on com-
panies, which have to grapple with the ongoing attack waves. At the same
time, our strategic understanding of the threat and the adversarial interaction
between organizations and cybercriminals perpetrating ransomware attacks is
lacking.
In this paper, we develop, to the best of our knowledge, the first game-
theoretic model of the ransomware ecosystem. Our model captures a multi-
stage scenario involving organizations from different industry sectors facing a
sophisticated ransomware attacker. We place particular emphasis on the de-
cision of companies to invest in backup technologies as part of a contingency
plan, and the economic incentives to pay a ransom if impacted by an attack.
We further study to which degree comprehensive industry-wide backup invest-
ments can serve as a deterrent for ongoing attacks.
Keywords: Ransomware, Backups, Security Economics, Game Theory
1 Introduction
Already in 1996, Young and Yung coined the term cryptovirological attacks and
provided a proof-of-concept implementation of what could now be considered a
major building block of ransomware malware [34]. Due to the perceived seriousness
of this attack approach, they also suggested that “access to cryptographic tools
should be well controlled.”
Malware featuring ransomware behavior was at first deployed at modest scale
(e.g., variants of PGPCoder/GPCode between approximately 2005-2010), and often
suffered from technical weaknesses, which even led a researcher in the field to pro-
claim that “ransomware as a mass extortion mean is certainly doomed to failure”
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[11]. However, later versions of GPCode already used 1024-bit RSA key encryption;
a serious threat even for well-funded organizations.
Ransomware came to widespread prominence with the CryptoLocker attack in
2013, which utilized Bitcoin as a payment vehicle [20]. Since then, the rise of
ransomware has been dramatic, culminating (so far) with the 2017 attack waves
of the many variants of the WannaCrypt/WannaCry and the Petya ransomwares.
Targets include all economic sectors and devices ranging from desktop computers,
entire business networks, industrial facilities, and also mobile devices. Security
industry as well as law enforcement estimates for the amount of money successfully
extorted and the (very likely much larger) overall damage caused by ransomware
attacks differ widely. However, the figures are significant (see Section 5). Observing
these developments, in a very recent retrospective article, Young and Yung bemoan
the lack of adequate response focused on ransomware attacks by all stakeholders
even though the threat was known for over 20 years [35].
As with any security management decision, there is a choice between doing
nothing to address a threat, or selecting an appropriate investment level. In the
case of responding to a sophisticated ransomware attack, this primarily concerns
decisions on how to invest in backup and recovery technologies, and whether to pay
a ransom in case of a successful attack. These decisions are interrelated.
The empirical evidence is mixed (and scarce). It is probably fair to say that
backup technologies have always been somewhat of a stepchild in the overall portfolio
of security technologies. In 2001, a survey showed that only 41% of the respondents
did data backups and 69% had not recently facilitated a backup; at the same time,
25% reported to have lost data [7]. In 2009, another survey found backup usage of
less than 50%; and 66% reported to have lost files (42% within the last 12 months)
[15]. In a backup awareness survey that has been repeated annually since 2008,
the figures for individuals who never created backups have been slowly improving.
Starting at 38% in 2008, in the most recent survey in June 2017 only 21% reported
to have never made a backup. Still, only 37% now report to create at least monthly
backups [3], despite the heightened media attention given to ransomware.
Regarding ransom payment behavior, IBM surveyed 600 business leaders in the
U.S about ransomware, and their data management practices and perceptions.
Within their sample, almost 50% of the business representatives reported ran-
somware attacks in their organizations. Interestingly, 70% of these executives re-
ported that ransom payments were made in order to attempt a resolution of the
incident. About 50% paid over $10,000 and around 20% reported money trans-
fers of over $40,000 [14]. In contrast, a different survey of ransomware-response
practices found that 96% of those affected (over the last 12 months) did not pay
a ransom [18]. However, the characteristics of the latter sample are not described
[18]. Finally, recent cybercrime measurement studies have tracked the approximate
earnings for particular ransomware campaigns (for example, by tracking related Bit-
coin wallets). These studies typically do not succeed in pinpointing the percentage
of affected individuals or organizations paying the ransom (e.g., [17, 20]).
Our work targets two key aspects of a principled response to sophisticated ran-
somware attacks. First, we develop an economic model to further our strategic
understanding of the adversarial interaction between organizations attacked by ran-
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somware and ransomware attackers. As far as we know, our work is the first such
game-theoretic model.
Second, we study the aforementioned response approaches to diminish the eco-
nomic impact of the ransomware threat on organizations. As such our model focuses
on organizations’ decision-making regarding backup investments (as part of an over-
all contingency plan), which is an understudied subject area. We further determine
how backup security investments interact with an organization’s willingness to pay
a ransom in case of a ransomware attack.
Further, we numerically show how (coordinated) backup investments by organi-
zations can have a deterrent effect on ransomware attackers. Since backup invest-
ments are a private good and are not subject to technical interdependencies, this
observation is novel to the security economics literature and relatively specific to
ransomware. Note, for example, that in the context of cyberespionage and data
breaches to exfiltrate data, such a deterrence effect of backup investments is unob-
servable.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we develop our game-theoretic model. We
conduct a thorough analysis of the model in Section 3. In Section 4, we complement
our analytic results with a numerical analysis. We discuss additional related work on
ransomware as well as security economics in Section 5, and offer concluding remarks
in Section 6.
2 Model
We model ransomware attacks as a multi-stage, multi-defender security game. Ta-
ble 1 shows a list of the symbols used in our model.
Table 1: List of Symbols
Symbol Description
Gj set of organizations belonging to group j
Wj initial wealth of organizations in group j
β discounting factor for uncertain future losses
Fj cost of data loss due to random failures in group j
Lj cost of permanent data loss due to ransomware attacks in group j
Tj loss from business interruptions due to ransomware in group j
D base difficulty of perpetrating ransomware attacks
CB unit cost of backup effort
CA unit cost of attack effort
CD fixed cost of developing ransomware
bi backup effort of organization i
pi decision of organization i about ransom payment
aj attacker’s effort against group j
r ransom demanded by the attacker
Vj(a1, a2) probability of an organization i ∈ Gj becoming compromised
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2.1 Players
On the defenders’ side, players model organizations that are susceptible to ran-
somware attacks. Based on their characteristics, we divide these organizations into
two groups (e.g., hospitals and universities). We will refer to these two groups as
group 1 and group 2, and we let set G1 and set G2 denote their members, respec-
tively. On the attacker’s side, there is a single player, who models cybercriminals
that may develop and deploy ransomware. Note that we model attackers as a single
entity since our goal is to understand and improve the behavior of defenders; hence,
competition between attackers is not our current focus. Our model—and many of
our results—could be extended to multiple attackers in a straightforward manner.
2.2 Strategy Spaces
With our work, we focus on the mitigation of ransomware attacks through back-
ups (as a part of contingency plans), and we will not consider the organizations’
decisions on preventative effort (e.g., firewall security policies). The tradeoff be-
tween mitigation and preventative efforts has been subject of related work [13]. We
let bi ∈ R+ denote the backup effort of organization i, which captures the frequency
and coverage of backups as well as contingency plans and preparations. Compro-
mised organizations also have to decide whether they pay the ransom or sustain
permanent data loss. We let pi = 1 if organization i pays, and pi = 0 if it does not
pay.
The attacker first decides whether it wishes to engage in cybercrime using ran-
somware. If the attacker chooses to engage, then it has to select the amount of
effort spent on perpetrating the attacks. We let a1 ∈ R≥0 and a2 ∈ R≥0 denote the
attacker’s effort spent on attacking group 1 and group 2, respectively. If the attacker
chooses not to attack group j (or not to engage in cybercrime at all), then aj = 0.
We assume that each organization within a group falls victim to the attack with the
same probability Vj(a1, a2), which depends on the attacker’s effort, independently
of the other organizations. Since the marginal utility of attack effort is typically
decreasing, we assume that the infection probability Vj(a1, a2) is
Vj(a1, a2) =
aj
D + (a1 + a2)
, (1)
where D is the base difficulty of attacks. In the formula above, the numerator
expresses that as the attacker increases its effort on group j, more and more orga-
nizations fall victim. Meanwhile, the denominator captures the decreasing marginal
utility: as the attacker increases its attack effort, compromising additional targets
becomes more and more difficult. In practice, this corresponds to the increasing dif-
ficulty of finding new targets as organizations are becoming aware of a widespread
ransomware attack and are taking precautions, etc.
The attacker also has to choose the amount of ransom r to demand from com-
promised organizations in exchange for restoring their data and systems.
2.2.1 Stages
The game consists of two stages:
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• Stage I: Organizations choose their backup efforts b, while the attacker chooses
its attack effort a1 and a2, as well as its ransom demand r.
• Stage II: Each organization i ∈ Gj becomes compromised with probability
Vj(a1, a2). Then, organizations that have fallen victim to the attack choose
whether to pay the ransom or not, which is represented by p.
2.3 Payoffs
2.3.1 Defender’s Payoff
If an organization i, which belongs to group j ∈ {1, 2}, has not fallen victim to a
ransomware attack, then its payoff is
UOi
∣∣
not compromised
=Wj − CB · bi − β
Fj
bi
, (2)
where Wj is the initial wealth of organizations in group j, Fj is their loss resulting
from corrupted data due to random failures1, and CB is the unit cost of backup
effort. The parameter β is a behavioral discount factor, which captures the robust
empirical observation that individuals underappreciate the future consequences of
their current actions [23]. The magnitude of β is assumed to be related to under-
investment in security and privacy technologies [1, 12]; in our case, procrastination
of backup investments [4].2
Otherwise, we have two cases. If organization i decides to pay the ransom r,
then its payoff is
Wj − CB · bi − β
(
Fj
bi
+ Tj + r
)
,
where Tj is the loss resulting from temporary business interruption due to the attack.
On the other hand, if organization i does not pay the ransom, then its payoff is
Wj − CB · bi − β
(
Fj + Lj
bi
+ Tj
)
,
where Lj is the loss resulting from permanent data loss due to the ransomware
attack. Using pi, we can express a compromised organization’s payoff as
UOi
∣∣
compromised
=Wj − CB · bi − β
(
Fj + (1− pi) · Lj
bi
+ Tj + pi · r
)
. (3)
1Since we interpret effort bi primarily as the frequency of backups, the fraction
1
bi
is proportional
to the expected time since the last backup. Consequently, we assume that data losses are inversely
proportional to bi. Note that alternative interpretations, such as assuming bi to be the level of
sophistication of backups (e.g., air-gapping), which determines the probability that the backups
remain uncompromised, also imply a similar relationship.
2We are unaware of any behavioral study that specifically investigates the impact of the present
bias behavioral discount factor on backup decisions, but industry experts argue strongly for its
relevance. For example, in the context of the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attacks a commentary
about backups stated: “This may be stating the obvious, but it’s still amazing to know the sheer
number of companies that keep procrastinating over this important task [31].”
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By combining Equations (2) and (3) with Vj , we can express the expected utility
of an organization i ∈ Gj as
E [UOi ] = (1− Vj(a1, a2))
[
Wj − CB · bi − β
Fj
bi
]
+ Vj(a1, a2)
[
Wj − CB · bi − β
(
Fj + (1− pi) · Lj
bi
+ Tj + pi · r
)]
. (4)
2.3.2 Attacker’s Payoff
For the attacker’s payoff, we also have two cases. If the attacker decides not to
participate (i.e., if a1 = 0 and a2 = 0), then its payoff is simply zero. Otherwise, its
payoff depends on the number of organizations that have fallen victim and decided
to pay. We can calculate the expected number of victims who pay the ransom as
E[number of victims who pay the ransom] =
∑
j
∑
i∈Gj
Vj(a1, a2) · pi (5)
since each organization i ∈ Gj is compromised with probability Vj , and pi = 1 if
organization i chooses to pay (and pi = 0 if it does not pay).
Then, we can express the attacker’s expected payoff simply as
E [UA] =

∑
j
∑
i∈Gj
Vj(a1, a2) · pi

 · r − CA · (a1 + a2)− CD, (6)
where CA is the unit cost of attack effort, and CD is the fixed cost of developing a
ransomware, which the attacker must pay if it decides to engage (i.e., if a1 > 0 or
a2 > 0).
2.4 Solution Concepts
We assume that every player is interested in maximizing its expected payoff, and
we use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as our solution concept. We also assume
that organizations always break ties (i.e., when both paying and not paying are best
responses) by choosing to pay. Note that the latter assumption has no practical
implications, it only serves to avoid pathological mathematical cases.
Further, in our numerical analysis in Section 4, we will use the social optimum
concept for comparison with the Nash equilibrium results. In the social optimum, a
social planner can coordinate the decisions of organizations, such that it yields the
maximum aggregate outcome for the organizations, subject to an optimal response
by the attacker (who is not guided by the social planner).
3 Analysis
In this section, we analyze our proposed game-theoretic model of the ransomware
ecosystem. Our solution concept, as mentioned in Section 2.4, is the subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium. Hence, in our analysis, we first calculate each organization’s
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decision in Stage II in Section 3.1. In other words, we derive under what conditions
a victim organization will pay the requested ransom from the attacker. Then, we
calculate the best-response backup strategy for each organization in Stage I of the
game in Section 3.2. Third, we calculate the attacker’s best-response, i.e., demanded
ransom and the attacker’s effort, in Section 3.3. By calculating the attacker’s and
the organizations’ best-responses, we can then derive the Nash equilibrium in Sec-
tion 3.4.
3.1 Compromised Organizations’ Ransom Payment Decisions
We begin our analysis by studying the compromised organizations’ best-response
payment strategies in the second stage of the game.
Lemma 1. For organization i ∈ Gj , paying the ransom (i.e., pi = 1) is a best
response if and only if
r ≤
Lj
bi
. (7)
Proof of Lemma 1 is provided in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 1 means that an organization will pay the demanded ransom if the de-
manded value is not higher than the average permanent data loss due to ransomware
attack.
3.2 Organizations’ Backup Decisions
We next study the organizations’ best-response backup strategies in the first stage.
We assume that compromised organizations will play their best responses in the sec-
ond stage (see Lemma 1), but we do not make any assumptions about the attacker’s
effort or ransom strategies. We first characterize the organizations’ best-response
backup strategies when they do not face any attacks (Lemma 2) and then in the
case when they are threatened by ransomware (Lemma 3).
Lemma 2. If the attacker chooses not to attack group j (i.e., aj = 0), then the
unique best-response backup strategy for organization i ∈ Gj is
b∗i =
√
β
Fj
CB
. (8)
Proof of Lemma 2 is provided in Appendix A.2.
Note that in Lemma 2, an organization chooses its backup strategy by consider-
ing data loss due to random failures rather than data loss due to ransomware attack
since that organization is not chosen to be attacked by the attacker.
Lemma 3 calculates an organization’s best-response backup strategy. Note that
an organization chooses its backup strategy at Stage I. In this stage, an organi-
zation does not know whether it is the target of a ransomware attack and if that
organization is the target of a ransomware attack, whether the attack is successful.
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Lemma 3. If the attacker chooses to attack group j (i.e., aj > 0), then the best-
response backup strategy b∗i for organization i ∈ Gj is
• if blowj >
Lj
r
, then b∗i = b
high
j ;
• if bhighj <
Lj
r
, then b∗i = b
low
j ;
• otherwise, b∗i ∈
{
blowj , b
high
j
}
(the one that gives the higher payoff or both if
the resulting payoffs are equal),
where blowj =
√
β
Fj
CB
and bhighj =
√
β
(Fj+Vj(a1,a2)Lj)
CB
.
Proof of Lemma 3 is provided in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 3 shows the best-response backup strategy when an organization is under
attack. If the demanded ransom value is high, i.e., r >
Lj
blowj
, an organization takes
into account the data loss due to ransomware attack as well as the data loss due to
random failure when choosing the backup strategy level. On the other hand, if the
demanded ransom is low, i.e., r <
Lj
b
high
j
, an organization does not care about the
data loss due to ransomware attack even when that organization is under attack.
In other words, that organization behaves like an organization that is not under
ransomware attack, i.e., similar to Lemma 2.
3.3 Attacker’s Best Response
Building on the characterization of the organizations’ best responses, we now char-
acterize the attacker’s best-response strategies. Notice that the lemmas presented in
the previous section show that an organization’s best response does not depend on
the identity of the organization, only on its group. Since we are primarily interested
in studying equilibria, in which everyone plays a best response, we can make the
following assumptions:
• All organizations within a group j play the same backup strategy, which is
denoted by bˆj.
• L1
bˆ1
≤ L2
bˆ2
.
The second assumption is without loss of generality since we could easily re-number
the groups.
In Lemma 4, we calculate the attacker’s best-response demanded ransom given
the attacker’s effort and the organizations’ backup strategies.
Lemma 4. If the attacker’s effort (a1, a2) is fixed, then its best-response ransom
demand r∗ is
• L1
bˆ1
if |G1|V1(a1, a2)
L1
bˆ1
> |G2|V2(a1, a2)
(
L2
bˆ2
− L1
bˆ1
)
• L2
bˆ2
if |G1|V1(a1, a2)
L1
bˆ1
< |G2|V2(a1, a2)
(
L2
bˆ2
− L1
bˆ1
)
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• both L1
bˆ1
and L2
bˆ2
otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 4 is provided in Appendix A.4.
Lemma 5 shows how the attacker divides its best-response attack effort between
the two groups of organizations. Here, we assume that a1 + a2 = asum, where asum
is a constant. Note that it is possible that the attacker decides not to attack either
of the groups of organizations. The reason is that the benefit for the attacker from
a ransomware attack may be lower than the cost of the attack. Hence, a rational
attacker will abstain from attacking either of the groups.
Lemma 5. The attacker’s best-response attack effort (a∗1, a
∗
2) is as follows:
• a∗1 = 0 and a
∗
2 = asum if |G1| · 1
{
r≤
L1
bˆ1
} < |G2| · 1{
r≤
L2
bˆ2
} and asum
D+asum
|G2| · r ·
1{
r≤
L2
bˆ2
} > CA · asum + CD,
• a∗1 = asum and a
∗
2 = 0 if |G1| · 1
{
r≤
L1
bˆ1
} > |G2| · 1{r≤L2
bˆ2
} and asum
D+asum
|G1| · r ·
1{
r≤
L2
bˆ2
} > CA · asum + CD,
• any a∗1 between 0 and asum and a
∗
2 = asum−a
∗
1 if |G1|·1
{
r≤
L1
bˆ1
} = |G2|·1{r≤L2
bˆ2
}
and asum
D+asum
|G2| · r · 1{r≤L2
bˆ2
} > CA · asum + CD.
• a∗1 = a
∗
2 = 0 otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 5 is provided in Appendix A.5.
3.4 Equilibria
Proposition 1 provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for the attacker’s
strategy to abstain from attack, i.e., a∗1 = a
∗
2 = 0, and bˆ
∗
1 =
√
β F1
CB
and bˆ∗2 =
√
β F2
CB
is Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1. The attacker choosing not to attack and the organizations choosing
backup efforts
√
β F1
CB
and
√
β F2
CB
is an equilibrium if and only if each of the following
conditions are satisfied:
•
L2·asum·|G2|·1{
r≤
L2
bˆ2
}
L2(D+asum)(CA·asum+CD)
<
√
β F2
CB
and |G1| · 1{r≤L1
bˆ1
} ≤ |G2| · 1{r≤L2
bˆ2
}
•
L2·asum·|G1|·1{
r≤
L1
bˆ1
}
L2(D+asum)(CA·asum+CD)
<
√
β F2
CB
and |G1| · 1{r≤L1
bˆ1
} > |G2| · 1{r≤L2
bˆ2
}
Proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix A.6.
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4 Numerical Illustrations
In this section, we present numerical results on our model. We first compare equilib-
ria to social optima, and we study the effect of changing the values of key parameters
(Section 4.1). We then investigate interdependence between multiple groups of or-
ganizations, which is caused by the strategic nature of attacks, and we again study
the effect of changing key parameters (Section 4.2).
For any combination of parameter values, our game has at most one equilibrium,
which we will plot in the figures below. However, for some combinations, the game
does not have an equilibrium. In these cases, we used iterative best responses:
1. starting from an initial strategy profile,
2. we changed the attacker’s strategy to a best response,
3. we changed the organization’s strategy to a best response,
4. and then we repeated from Step 2.
We found that regardless of the initial strategy profile, the iterative best-response
dynamics end up oscillating between two strategy profiles. Since these strategy
profiles were very close, we plotted their averages in place of the equilibria in the
figures below.
4.1 Equilibria and Social Optima
For clarity of presentation, we consider a single organization type in this subsection.
The parameter values used in this study are as follows: |G| = 100, W = 100,
β = 0.9, F = 5, L = 5, T = 10, CB = 1, D = 10, CA = 10, and CD = 10 (unless
stated otherwise).
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Figure 1: The expected payoff of the attacker (red) and an individual organization
(blue) in equilibrium (solid line —) and in social optimum (dashed line - - -) for
various backup cost values CB.
Figure 1 shows the expected payoffs of an individual organization and the at-
tacker for various values of the unit cost CB of backup effort. In practice, the unit
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cost of backup effort may change, for example, due to technological improvements
(decreasing the cost) or growth in the amount of data to be backed up (increasing
the cost). When this cost is very low (CB < 0.5), organizations can perform fre-
quent and sophisticated backups, which means that the amount of data that may be
compromised—and hence, the ransom that they are willing to pay—is very low. As a
result, the attacker is deterred from deploying ransomware (UA = 0) since its income
from ransoms would not cover its expenses. For higher costs (0.5 ≤ CB < 1), the or-
ganizations’ equilibrium payoff is much lower since they choose to save on backups,
which incentivizes the attacker to deploy ransomware and extort payments from
them. In this case, the social optimum for the organizations is to maintain backup
efforts and, hence, deter the attacker. For even higher costs (CB ≥ 1), deterrence
is not socially optimal. However, the equilibrium payoffs are still lower since orga-
nizations shirk on backup efforts, which leads to more intense attacks and higher
ransom demands.
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Figure 2: The expected payoff of the attacker (red) and an individual organization
(blue) in equilibrium (solid line —) and in social optimum (dashed line - - -) for
various attack cost values CA.
Figure 2 shows the expected payoff of an individual organization and the at-
tacker for various values of the unit cost CA of attack effort. In practice, the unit
cost of attack effort can change, e.g., due to the development of novel attacks and
exploits (lowering the cost) or the deployment of more effective defenses (increas-
ing the cost). Figure 2 shows phenomena that are similar to the ones exhibited in
Figure 1. When the attacker is at a technological advantage (i.e., when CA is low),
deterrence is not a realistic option for organizations. However, they can improve
their payoffs—compared to the equilibrium—by coordinating and investing more in
backups, thereby achieving social optimum. For higher attack costs (10 < CA ≤ 15),
this coordination can result in significantly higher payoffs since deterrence becomes
a viable option. For very high attack costs (CA > 15), compromising an organiza-
tion costs more than what the attacker could hope to collect with ransoms; hence,
coordination is no longer necessary to deter the attacker.
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Figure 3: The attacker’s expected payoff (red) and the organizations’ backup strat-
egy (green) in equilibrium (solid line —) and in social optimum (dashed line - - -)
for various discounting factor values β.
Figure 3 shows how the organizations’ backup efforts b and the attacker’s payoff
are effected by the behavioral discount factor β. With low values of β, organiza-
tions underappreciate future consequences; hence, they shirk on backup efforts (as
evidenced by low values of b). With high values of β, organizations care more about
future losses, so they invest more in backup efforts (resulting in high values of b).
We see that in all cases, there is a significant difference between the equilibrium and
the social optimum. This implies that regardless of the organizations’ appreciation
of future consequences, coordination is necessary. In other words, low backup efforts
cannot be attributed only to behavioral factors.
4.2 Interdependence
Now, we study the interdependence between two groups of organizations. We in-
stantiate the parameters of both organizations (and the attacker) with the same
values as in the previous subsection. Note that more numerical illustrations are
available in Appendix B.
Figure 4 shows the payoffs of individual organizations from the two groups as
well as the attacker, for various values of the costs L1 and L2 of permanent data
loss. As expected, we see from the attacker’s payoff (Figure 4(c)) that as loss costs
increase, organizations become more willing to pay higher ransoms, so the attacker’s
payoff increases. On the other hand, we observe a more interesting phenomenon in
the organizations’ payoffs. As the loss cost (e.g., L1) of one group (e.g., group 1)
increases, the payoff of organizations in that group (e.g., Figure 4(a)) decreases.
However, we also see an increase in the payoff (e.g., Figure 4(b)) of organizations
in the other group (e.g., group 2). The reason for this increase is in the strategic
nature of attacks: as organizations in one group become more attractive targets,
attackers are more inclined to focus their efforts on this group, which results in
12
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(a) payoff for an organization of type 1 (b) payoff for an organization of type 2
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(c) payoff for the attacker
Figure 4: The expected payoff of individual organizations of (a) type 1 and (b) type
2 as well as (c) the attacker in equilibrium for various data loss costs L1 and L2.
lower intensity attacks against the other group. This substitution effect, which
can be viewed as a negative externality between groups of organizations, is strong
when the attacker’s efforts are focused (e.g., when ransomware is deployed using
spear-phishing campaigns).
5 Related Work
Ransomware: Early work by Luo and Liao, in 2007 and 2009, respectively, rep-
resented first exploratory analyses of the ransomware phenomenon [21, 22]. They
focus on increased awareness (in particular, by employees) as a major means to
diminish the effectiveness of ransomware attacks, which is a key recommendation
regarding ransomware mirrored in the 2017 Verizon DBIR report ten years later:
“stress the importance of software updates to anyone who’ll listen [32].”
In 2010, Gazet investigated the quality of code, functionalities and cryptographic
primitives of 15 samples of ransomware [11]. The studied sample of ransomware mal-
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ware was quite basic from the perspective of programming quality and sophistica-
tion, and did not demonstrate a high level of thoroughness regarding the application
of cryptographic primitives. However, the analysis also showed the ability to mass
propagate as a key feature.
Highlighting ransomware’s increasing relevance, Proofpoint reported that 70%
of all malware encountered in the emails of its customer base during a 10-month
interval in 2016 was ransomware. At the same time, the same company reported that
the number of malicious email attachments grew by about 600% in comparison to
2015 [25]. In addition, many modern forms of ransomware have worm capabilities
as demonstrated in a disconcerting fashion by the 2017 WannaCrypt/WannaCry
attack, which affected 100,000s of systems of individual users and organizations
leading even to the breakdown of industrial facilities.
Other studies also focus on providing practical examples of and empirical data
on ransomware including work by O’Gorman and McDonald [24], who provide an
in-depth perspective of specific ransomware campaigns and their financial impact.
In a very comprehensive fashion, Kharraz et al. analyze ransomware code observed
in the field between 2006 and 2014 [17]. Their results mirror Gazet’s observation
on a much broader pool of 1,359 ransomware samples, i.e., currently encountered
ransomware lacks complexity and sophistication.
Nevertheless, it causes major harm. To cite just a few figures, the total cost of
ransomware attacks (including paid ransoms) increased to $209 Million for the first
three months in 2016 according to FBI data. In comparison, for 2015 the FBI only
reported damages of about $24 Million [9].
Drawing on their earlier research, Kharraz et al. developed practices to stem the
impact of ransomware. Their key insight is that ransomware needs to temper with
user or business data, so that increased monitoring of data repositories can stop
ransomware attacks while they unfold, and detect novel attacks that bypassed even
sophisticated preventative measures [16]. Scaife et al. also present an early-warning
detection approach regarding suspicious file activity [26].
Extending this line of work to a new context, Andronio et al. study ransomware
in the mobile context and develop an automated approach for detection while pay-
ing attention to multiple typical behaviors of ransomware including the display of
ransom notes on the device’s screen [2]. Likewise, Yang et al. focus on mobile
malware detection, and specifically ransomware identification [33].
Ransomware attacks appear to be predominantly motivated by financial motives,
which supports the usage of an economic framework for their analysis. However,
other related types of attacks such as malicious device bricking (see, for example, the
BrickerBot attack focusing on IoT devices [28]) may be based on a purely destructive
agenda, with less clearly identifiable motives.
While knowledge about the technical details and financial impact of ransomware
is growing, we are unaware of any research which focuses on the strategic economic
aspects of the interactions between cybercriminals that distribute ransomware and
businesses or consumers who are affected by these actions.
Economics of Security: Game-theoretic models to better understand security
scenarios have gained increased relevance due to the heightened professionalism of
cybercriminals. Of central interest are models that capture interdependencies or
14
externalities arising from actions by defenders or attackers [19].
A limited number of research studies focus on the modeling of the attack side.
For example, Schechter and Smith capture different attacker behaviors [27]. In par-
ticular, they consider the cases of serial attacks where attackers aim to compromise
one victim after another, and the case of a parallel attack, where attackers can au-
tomate their attacks to focus on multiple defenders at one point in time. We follow
the latter approach, which has high relevance for self-propagating ransomware such
as WannaCrypt/WannaCry.
Another relevant aspect of our work are incentives to invest in backup technolo-
gies, which have found only very limited consideration in the literature. Grossklags
et al. investigate how a group of defenders individually decide on how to split
security investments between preventative technologies and recovery technologies
(called self-insurance) [13]. In their model, preventative investments are subject to
interdependencies drawing on canonical models from the literature on public goods
[30], while recovery investments are effective independent from others’ choices. Fultz
and Grossklags [10] introduce strategically acting attackers in this framework, who
respond to preventative investments by all defenders. In our model, backup in-
vestments are also (partially) effective irrespective of others’ investment choices.
However, in the context of ransomware, pervasive investments in backup technolo-
gies can have a deterrence and/or displacement effect on attackers [5], which we
capture with our work.
While we draw on these established research directions, to the best of our knowl-
edge, our work is the first game-theoretic approach focused on ransomware.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed a game-theoretic model, which is focused on key as-
pects of the adversarial interaction between organizations and ransomware attackers.
In particular, we place significant emphasis on the modeling of security investment
decisions for mitigation, i.e., level of backup effort, as well as the strategic decision
to pay a ransom or not.
These factors are interrelated and also influence attacker behavior. For example,
in the context of kidnappings by terrorists it has been verified based on incident data
that negotiating with kidnappers and making concessions encourages substantially
more kidnappings in the future [6]. We would expect a similar effect in the context
of ransomware, where independently acting organizations who are standing with
the “back against the wall” have to make decisions about ransom payments to get
operations going again, or to swallow the bitter pill of rebuilding from scratch and
not giving in to cybercriminals. Indeed, our analysis shows that there is a sizable gap
between the decentralized decision-making at equilibrium and the socially optimal
outcome. This raises the question whether organizations paying ransoms should
be penalized? However, this (in turn) poses a moral dilemma, for example, when
patient welfare at hospitals or critical infrastructure such at power plants are affected
now.
An alternative pathway is to (finally) pay significantly more attention to backup
efforts as a key dimension of overall security investments. The relative absence of
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economic research focused on optimal mitigation and recovery strategies is one key
example of this omission. A laudable step forward is the recently released factsheet
document by the U.S. Department of Health & Human Service on ransomware
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [29]. It not
only states that the encryption of health data by ransomware should be considered
a security breach under HIPAA (even though no data is exfiltrated3), but also
that having a data backup plan is a required security effort for all HIPAA covered
organizations.
An interesting question for future research is the role of cyberinsurance in the
context of ransomware, i.e., specifically policies including cyber-extortion. How
would these policies have to be designed to achieve desirable outcomes? As dis-
cussed above, in the case of kidnappings one would worry about incentivizing future
kidnappings by making concessions via kidnapping insurance [8]; however, the de-
sign space in the context of ransomware is significantly more complex, but also offers
more constructive directions.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
From Equation (3), we have that the best-response strategy p∗i of organization i is
p∗i ∈ argmax
p∈{0,1}
[
Wj − CB · bi − β
(
Fj + (1− p) · Lj
bi
+ Tj + p · r
)]
(9)
= argmax
p∈{0,1}
p ·
(
Lj
bi
− r
)
. (10)
Clearly, p∗i = 1 is a best response if and only if
Lj
bi
− r ≥ 0, and p∗i = 0 is a best
response if and only if
Lj
bi
− r ≤ 0.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From Equation (2), we have that the best-response strategy b∗i of organization i is
b∗i ∈ argmax
bi∈R+
[
Wj − CB · bi − β
Fj
bi
]
. (11)
To find the maximizing b∗i , we take the first derivative of the payoff, and set it equal
to 0:
−CB + β
Fj
b∗i
2 = 0 (12)
b∗i = ±
√
β
Fj
CB
, (13)
Since bi ∈ R+, the only local optima is b
∗
i =
√
β
Fj
CB
. Further, the payoff is a concave
function of bi as the second derivative is negative, which means that this b
∗
i is the
global optimum and, hence, a unique best response.
19
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
We can express the expected payoff of organization i as
E [UO] =(1− Vj(a1, a2))
[
Wj − CB · bi − β
Fj
bi
]
+ Vj(a1, a2)
[
Wj − CB · bi − β
(
Fj + (1− p
∗
i (bi)) · Lj
bi
+ Tj + p
∗
i (bi) · r
)]
=Wj − CB · bi − β
Fj
bi
− βVj(a1, a2)
[
(1− p∗i (bi)) · Lj
bi
+ Tj + p
∗
i (bi) · r
]
.
Notice that we incorporated the second-stage best-response payment strategy p∗i (bi),
which is given by Lemma 1 and depends on the backup strategy bi.
We find the best response b∗i by dividing the search space into two regions,
bi ≤
Lj
r
and bi ≥
Lj
r
, and find the best strategies in both regions.
Case 1: First, consider bi ≤
Lj
r
, which implies that p∗i (bi) = 1. In this case, the
best backup strategy b∗i ≤
Lj
r
is
b∗i ∈ argmax
bi≤
Lj
r
[
Wj − CB · bi − β
Fj
bi
− βVj(a1, a2) (Tj + r)
]
(14)
= argmax
bi≤
Lj
r
[
−CB · bi − β
Fj
bi
]
. (15)
Notice that this is equivalent to the maximization problem considered in Lemma 2,
whose solution was
√
β
Fj
CB
. From the concavity of the objective, it follows that the
best strategy b∗i ≤
Lj
r
is min
{√
β
Fj
CB
,
Lj
r
}
.
Case 2: Second, consider bi ≥
Lj
r
. In this case, the best backup strategy b∗i ≥
Lj
r
can be expressed as
b∗i ∈ argmax
bi≥
Lj
r
[
Wj − CB · bi − β
Fj
bi
− βVj(a1, a2)
(
Lj
bi
+ Tj
)]
(16)
= argmax
bi≥
Lj
r
[
−CB · bi −
β
bi
(Fj + Vj(a1, a2)Lj)
]
. (17)
Note that the equation is correct even when bi =
Lj
r
(which implies p∗i = 1), since
we can substitute
Lj
bi
for r.
To find the best strategy b∗i ≥
Lj
r
, we take the first derivative of the objective
and set it equal to 0:
0 = −CB +
β
bi
2 (Fj + Vj(a1, a2)Lj) (18)
bi = ±
√
β
(Fj + Vj(a1, a2)Lj)
CB
. (19)
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Further, it is clear that the objective concave as the first derivative is strictly de-
creasing. Combining with the constraint bi ≥
Lj
r
, this implies that the best strategy
b∗i ≥
Lj
r
is max
{√
β
(Fj+Vj(a1,a2)Lj)
CB
,
Lj
r
}
.
Let’s define blowj =
√
β
Fj
CB
and bhighj =
√
β
(Fj+Vj(a1,a2)Lj)
CB
. Note that it is obvi-
ous that blowj ≤ b
high
j . If we have b
low
j >
Lj
r
, the organization’s payoff is increasing
in Case 1 and for Case 2, it is increasing in [
Lj
r
, b
high
j ] and decreasing in [b
high
j ,∞].
Hence, the organization’s payoff is maximized in bhighj . In a similar way, the organi-
zation’s payoff is maximized at blowj when b
high
j <
Lj
r
. Otherwise, the organization’s
payoff is increasing in [0, blowj ], decreasing in [b
low
j ,
Lj
r
], increasing in [
Lj
r
, b
high
j ], and
decreasing in [bhighj ,∞]. Therefore, b
∗
i ∈
{
blowj , b
high
j
}
(the one that gives the higher
payoff or both if the resulting payoffs are equal).
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
The best-response ransom demand r∗ is
r∗ ∈ argmax
r∈R+

∑
j
∑
i∈Gj
Vj(a1, a2) · r · p
∗
i (r)

 − CA · (a1 + a2)− CD (20)
= argmax
r∈R+
∑
j
∑
i∈Gj
Vj(a1, a2) · r · 1{
r≤
Lj
bˆj
} (21)
= argmax
r∈R+
∑
j
|Gj | · Vj(a1, a2) · r · 1{
r≤
Lj
bˆj
}. (22)
Clearly, the optimum is attained at either L1
bˆ1
or L2
bˆ2
. Since we assumed that L1
bˆ1
≤ L2
bˆ2
,
we have that r = L1
bˆ1
is a best response if and only if
(|G1|V1(a1, a2) + |G2|V2(a1, a2))
L1
bˆ1
≥ |G2|V2(a1, a2)
L2
bˆ2
(23)
|G1|V1(a1, a2)
L1
bˆ1
≥ |G2|V2(a1, a2)
(
L2
bˆ2
−
L1
bˆ1
)
. (24)
Further, an analogous condition holds for r = L2
bˆ2
being a best response, which
concludes our proof.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Recall that the attacker’s expected payoff is
E [UA] =

∑
j
∑
i∈Gj
Vj(a1, a2) · pi · r

−CA · (a1 + a2)−CD · 1{a1>0 or a2>0}. (25)
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Consider that a1+a2 = asum and r are given, and asum > 0. Under these conditions,
the attacker’s best strategy is
a∗1 ∈ argmax
a1≥0

∑
j
∑
i∈Gj
Vj(a1, a2) · p
∗
i (r) · r

 − CA · (a1 + a2)− CD (26)
= argmax
a1≥0
a1
D + asum
|G1| · 1{
r≤
L1
bˆ1
} + asum − a1
D + asum
|G2| · 1{
r≤
L2
bˆ2
}, (27)
giving the non-negative payoff. The best strategy can be calculated readily.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 5 shows the attacker’s best-response attack effort for fixed effort level, i.e.,
asum. In this Lemma, for example, a
∗
1 = 0 and a
∗
2 = asum is the attacker’s best-
response effort if |G1|·1{r≤L1
bˆ1
} < |G2|·1{r≤L2
bˆ2
} and the resulting attacker’s payoff is
non-negative. According to Lemma 4, the attacker’s best-response ransom demand
is either L1
bˆ1
or L2
bˆ2
and without loss of generality, we have assumed that L1
bˆ1
≤ L2
bˆ2
.
For this case, the attacker’s payoff is equal to:
E [UA] =
asum
D + asum
|G2| · r · 1{r≤L2
bˆ2
} − CA · asum − CD. (28)
If the above equation is negative, i.e.,
r <
(D + asum) (CA · asum + CD)
asum · |G2| · 1{r≤L2
bˆ2
} ,
the attacker’s best-response effort is a∗1 = a
∗
2 = 0. To satisfy the above condition,
we replace r with L2
bˆ2
, which gives
L2 · asum · |G2| · 1{r≤L2
bˆ2
}
L2 (D + asum) (CA · asum + CD)
< bˆ∗2.
Further, the defender’s best-response backup strategy when there is no attack,
i.e., a∗1 = a
∗
2 = 0 is calculated based on Lemma 2. By inserting the value of bˆ
∗
2 from
Lemma 2, we can readily have the following:
L2 · asum · |G2| · 1{r≤L2
bˆ2
}
L2 (D + asum) (CA · asum + CD)
<
√
β
F2
CB
.
Another condition can be calculated similarly.
B Further Numerical Illustrations
Figure 5 shows the payoffs of individual organizations from two groups as well as
the attacker, for various values of the costs F1 and F2 of random-failure data losses.
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Figure 5: The expected payoff of individual organizations of (a) type 1 and (b) type
2 as well as (c) the attacker in equilibrium for various costs of random-failure data
losses F1 and F2.
Figure 5(c) shows that the attacker’s payoff decreases as these costs increase, which
is in contrast with the cost-payoff relationship shown by Figure 4(c). The reason
for this decrease is that organizations spend more on backups when the cost of
random-failure data losses is higher, which in turn reduces the potential loss from
ransomware attacks and, hence, the ransom that an attacker may demand.
We see more interesting phenomena in the organizations’ payoffs. For most
combinations of cost values, as expected, the payoff of an organization decreases
gradually as the random-failure data loss cost in its group increases. However, for
certain combinations of cost values (e.g., F1 = 4 and F2 = 1), increasing the cost of
one group (e.g., group 1) increases the payoff of organizations in that group (see, e.g.,
Figure 5(a)) but reduces the payoff in the other group. This surprising phenomenon
is due to the incentives that increased costs of random-failure data losses provide for
organizations to invest more in backups. At certain tipping points, such as F1 = 4
and F2 = 1, even a small change in the costs can lead to a significantly different
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equilibrium, in which the focus of the attacker is shifted from one group to another.
This substitution effect is very similar to the one exhibited in Figure 4.
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